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LEGITIMACY, “CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM,”  
AND THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 
David. A. Strauss∗ 
Professor Michael Dorf’s review of The Living Constitution1 is 
both generous and enlightening.  I disagree with very little of what 
Dorf says, and some of the critical points he makes have caused me to 
rethink my arguments in ways that, I hope, will address his concerns. 
I.  FOCAL POINTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
It is a fixed point of our legal system that the text of the Constitu-
tion is binding, in the sense that no argument about constitutional law 
can disregard the language of the text.  Any claim about what the 
Constitution requires must ultimately invoke language in the text.  
And by the same token, it is never acceptable explicitly to ignore a 
provision of the text.  For example, you cannot say about a provision 
of the text — as you can about a precedent — that it has been over-
ruled by later legal developments or overtaken by events.  Anyone who 
said things like that would show that he or she did not understand a 
fundamental feature of the American legal order. 
As an abstract matter, it is easy to attack this aspect of our system.  
Thomas Jefferson showed the way.  Why should we be ruled by (in the 
cliché) the dead hand of the past?  Many pages have been devoted to 
answering that question, and I do not think an agreed-upon answer 
exists.  To speak simply of “fidelity” to the Framers does not solve the 
problem; we are willing to be “unfaithful” to the Framers — that is, to 
reject their understanding of what the Constitution would require — 
in all sorts of ways.  The problem is especially acute for someone who 
rejects originalism — even someone who rejects only what Professor 
Jack Balkin calls “original expected application” originalism, which is 
a form that nowadays even most professed originalists say they reject.  
The puzzle is this: why should we reject decisions that are not explicit-
ly encoded in the text but that we are certain the Framers believed 
they were enacting, while slavishly (the Jeffersonian skeptic might say) 
following decisions that happen to be encoded in the text?  Dorf makes 
the point well: “[I]f we need not be bound by the concrete expected 
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applications of long-dead framers and ratifiers, why should we be 
bound by the text they wrote?”2 
Take, for example, the Framers’ decision that each state must have 
two Senators.  No one would seriously suggest that the courts should 
order the Senate to be apportioned according to the principle of “one 
person, one vote.”  At the same time, though, the courts have ordered 
state legislatures to be apportioned according to that principle, even 
though we know essentially to a certainty that the Framers of the rele-
vant constitutional provisions did not believe that they were requiring 
state legislatures to be apportioned according to that rule.  Why is the 
Framers’ decision about the Senate sacrosanct, but their decision 
about state legislatures subject to judicial revision?  Again there are 
possible answers, but none that are generally accepted.  It is puzzling 
that such a central feature of our legal system should be so incomplete-
ly justified. 
The best justification, I think, is that the text serves as a kind of 
common ground, a focal point.  It resolves some issues so that we do 
not have to relitigate them constantly.  For example, it is very impor-
tant to know when the President’s term of office ends, and the text of 
the Constitution tells us.  On other matters — the nature of the crimi-
nal justice system, for example — the text narrows the range of op-
tions, even if it often does not give us clear answers.  Both of these are 
vital functions that a written, generally accepted text serves very well.  
If we allowed departures from the text — if we overruled some provi-
sions or declared them obsolete — we would impair, maybe fatally, the 
text’s ability to perform these functions. 
Dorf says that this “focal-point account of the Constitution does not 
fully capture the role the Constitution plays in American life.”3  He is 
clearly right about that.  Dorf goes on to say that the “vision of ‘consti-
tutional patriotism’” offered in Balkin’s impressive book Living Origi-
nalism “better fits Americans’ long-term attitudes toward our Consti-
tution.”4  I am a little leery of saying anything categorical about 
Americans’ attitudes toward the Constitution; Americans are a numer-
ous and diverse bunch, and as Dorf notes, misapprehensions about the 
Constitution are widespread.5  It is certainly true, though, that many 
people (including me) feel an attachment to the Constitution that goes 
well beyond what the focal-point theory describes. 
But I do not think this is a weakness of the focal-point theory; on 
the contrary, I think it is a virtue.  The focal-point view is an attempt 
to justify the use of the text to impose a legal regime — obligations 
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and benefits — on people.  That legal regime will be imposed by force 
if necessary.  It seems to me that such a justification should, if possible, 
not invoke deep affective attachments to the Constitution. 
More specifically, I think the justification has to be something that 
would persuade a person — a version of the Jeffersonian skeptic — 
who, let’s say, belongs to a distinctive religious or ethnic community 
with roots outside the United States, and whose attitude is: I want to 
live in this country, and I will play by the rules, but the Constitution is 
not part of my traditions and my heritage; I do not have any particu-
larly strong patriotic or affective ties to the United States, its Constitu-
tion, or its institutions.  It seems to me that we should have a justifica-
tion that explains to that individual why he or she is bound by the text 
of the Constitution.  I think the focal-point theory provides such a jus-
tification.  It gives a reason for following the text that everyone can 
accept, irrespective of any affective or emotional ties to the Constitu-
tion or to American traditions. 
Of course many of us do have such affective ties, as Dorf says, and 
any attempt “fully [to] capture the role the Constitution plays in Amer-
ican life” would have to say much more than the focal-point theory 
says.  But if we are not trying to give such a full account — but in-
stead just trying to figure out why the text can be used (as it unques-
tionably can be) to impose legal obligations on people — then we need 
a justification that is based on reason alone and does not rely on patri-
otic sentiments.  Otherwise the justification is in a sense sectarian, 
even if the sect is one to which most of us belong. 
II.  LEGITIMACY AND “DREADFUL RESULTS” 
Dorf questions whether a common law approach to constitutional 
law is sufficiently democratic.6  He first asks whether the common law 
approach can “lead to dreadful results” or is “more likely to be self-
correcting than other methods of interpretation.”7  He suggests that 
there is no guarantee that the common law approach will avoid subs-
tantively bad results; he gives the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Citizens United v. FEC8 as an example.9  On this point Dorf is right 
again.  There is no guarantee that the common law approach will al-
ways yield results that are right as a matter of fairness or good policy, 
and I agree with Dorf that Citizens United is an example of a case that 
uses, essentially, a common law approach to reach a result that is subs-
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tantively bad.10  The question, Dorf says, should be not whether the 
common law approach necessarily produces good substantive results, 
but only whether it produces “legitimate results.”11 
Legitimacy is a difficult notion to work with,12 but Dorf’s analysis 
is again illuminating.  If I understand him correctly, he argues that the 
common law approach, to be legitimate, must in some way be demo-
cratic.  Specifically, he says that a defense of the common law ap-
proach to constitutional law “ought to say that decisions reached 
through the common law method that stand the test of time derive 
their legitimacy from popular acceptance, not just from judicial 
craft.”13  He adds that “[a]lthough The Living Constitution emphasizes 
the Burkean virtues of the common law, it is best read as ultimately 
relying on democratic inputs to legitimate the living Constitution.”14 
Dorf’s comments raise an important issue — about the legitimacy 
of a common law constitutional system — that requires more attention 
than I gave it in The Living Constitution.  As Dorf implies, to say that 
a political institution is “legitimate” is not to say that it always produc-
es perfectly just results; if that were the test, few if any existing gov-
ernments would be legitimate.  Rather, an institution can be legitimate 
as long as it is reasonably just.  Also, of course, the institution has to 
be generally accepted by the population that it purports to govern.  We 
do not have to debate whether the Articles of Confederation were 
more just than the Constitution in order to know that the Articles are 
not now the legitimate government of the United States.15 
If legitimacy is understood in that way, then our common law con-
stitutional system is legitimate for several reasons.  First, it is our sys-
tem, and it is generally accepted.  That is what I argued in The Living 
Constitution, in any event.  The principles that we accept as a correct 
account of what the Constitution requires are, in substantial degree, 
the product of a common law–like process.  That descriptive claim ad-
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vances the normative claim that the common law approach to the 
Constitution is legitimate. 
Second, our common law constitutional system produces results 
that are reasonably just — or at least it has a better chance of doing so 
than its competitors.  Of course, whether a common law system pro-
duces just results ultimately depends on the people who administer it.  
But at least if a common law approach to the Constitution is com-
pared to originalism (assuming originalism can be made coherent), a 
common law approach — because it is grounded in Burkean notions of 
humility but admits occasional, limited recourse to considerations of 
justice and good policy — is more likely to be reasonably just.  That is 
the claim, in any event; if it is wrong, then to that extent the legitima-
cy of the common law approach can be questioned. 
The focal-point justification for adhering to the text is important in 
this connection.  The idea is to find a justification for a settled practice 
— the binding nature of the text — that should convince any reasona-
ble person, irrespective of that person’s cultural or religious beliefs or 
traditions.  Such a justification enhances the legitimacy of the system.  
A justification that depended on a specific, sectarian conception of 
what it means to be an American would leave the system open to the 
charge that it was not fully legitimate because it unjustly required 
people to comply with that conception. 
Finally, the Burkean approach that underpins the common law — 
although it is often seen as undemocratic or even antidemocratic — ac-
tually has a significant democratic basis.  This is the important point 
that I take Dorf to be making and that I had not seen before.  A cen-
tral Burkean idea is that institutions and practices that have survived 
for a long time are likely to embody a latent wisdom, even if those in-
stitutions and practices cannot be easily justified in abstract terms.  
Burkeans might distrust a sudden outpouring of popular sentiment — 
that is the arguably undemocratic aspect of Burkeanism — but a true 
Burkean, Dorf says, will pay attention to whether, say, a principle of 
constitutional law has gained general acceptance among the people at 
large for an extended time.  If a principle has taken hold among the 
people generally — not just among the elites — then, on Burkean log-
ic, that is an additional reason to accept the principle. 
This point of Dorf’s bolsters the democratic credentials of the 
common law approach and, to that degree, enhances its legitimacy.  In 
our system, decisions about what the Constitution requires — even 
when they are made by judges — are embedded in institutions that re-
spond to popular sentiment.  Legislatures can resist judicial rulings; 
new judges will be appointed by Presidents and confirmed by Sena-
tors, who have been elected.  This means that judicial decisions that 
do not gain at least widespread acquiescence are less likely to survive.  
On the Burkean premises of the common law, that is how things 
should be.  There is again a notable contrast with originalism.  There 
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is no reason to think that general public acceptance of a constitutional 
principle means that the principle is consistent with original under-
standings (or original public meanings, or whatever it is that original-
ists seek); and, by the same token, the public at large might reject in-
terpretations that are correct on originalist grounds.  By contrast, for 
the common law approach, long-term popular acceptance is one of the 
criteria of correctness.  In this way — and I take this to be Dorf’s po-
werful point — the common law approach has a democratic pedigree 
superior to that of originalism. 
One consequence of Dorf’s analysis is especially noteworthy in the 
current climate.  The common law approach is hostile to what might 
be called constitutional fundamentalism — the view that any constitu-
tional principle, no matter how well established, must ultimately be 
tested for conformity to a decision that was made when the relevant 
constitutional provision was adopted.  The common law approach re-
jects this view.  Under the common law approach, the requirements of 
the Constitution evolve over time and can become something quite dif-
ferent from what was contemplated when the constitutional provision 
in question was adopted.  That is the sense in which the common law 
constitution is a living constitution.  Dorf’s account of the democratic 
basis of the common law approach reinforces this central feature of 
that approach.  As Dorf says, we have many reasons to reject original-
ism.  His analysis of democratic legitimacy provides additional reasons 
and strengthens the case for a common law approach in particular. 
 
 
 
